On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules. by IÃ±aki Aguirre & Ana M. Martin
On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the
pricing game rules. 
Iñaki Aguirre Ana M. Martin
Universidad del Pais Vasco Universidad del Pais Vasco
Abstract
The strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of
price competition. We show that under simultaneous price competition and under
leader−follower price competition (with the discriminatory firm being the leader), the pricing
policy game is not, as stated by Thisse and Vives (1988), a Prisoner's Dilemma.
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1. Introduction
Thisse and Vives (1988) (TV) analyze the strategic choice of spatial price policy in a duopoly
market with homogeneous product and inelastic demand. They assume that if both firms choose the
same price policy, firms compete in prices simultaneously. But given that if firms choose different
price policies there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the pricing game under simultaneous
competition, they assume that the mill-pricing firm becomes a price leader and the discriminatory
firm is a follower.
 1 As price discrimination is a dominant strategy but firms would increase profits
under f.o.b. pricing the problem is like a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In this paper, we extend the analysis of TV by considering other types of competition when
firms choose different price policies: leader-follower price competition (with the discriminatory firm
being the leader) and simultaneous price competition (allowing mixed strategies). We conclude that
the tendency for firms to price discriminate found by TV does not in general hold and that
equilibrium price policies crucially depend on the rules of price competition. In the leader-follower
game equilibrium price policies depend on the consumer’s reservation value and in the most relevant
case there are two asymmetric equilibria in which one firm price discriminates and the other firm
prices uniformly. Under simultaneous price competition, we find a mixed strategies equilibrium when
firms choose different price policies and show that the price policy game has two equilibria: both
firms choose price discrimination or f.o.b. pricing.
2. The model
Two firms, 1 and 2, produce a homogeneous good in a spatial market [0,1] and are located at
the left and at the right endpoints of the market respectively. The (constant) marginal cost is identical
for both firms and normalized to zero. Consumers are distributed uniformly along the interval [0,1].
Each consumer has a reservation value, R, for the good, and buys one unit from the firm with the
lowest delivered price. When both firms have the same delivered price at a location the consumer
chooses the supplier with the lowest transportation cost.
2 The transportation cost is t(d) = td, where
d is the distance from the location of the consumer to the producer. We will assume that R > t.
3 The
delivered price at a location x must cover the transport cost.
4 The timing of the game is as follows.
Stage 1: Firms choose the price policy simultaneously. Stage 2: Firms decide the price level
simultaneously if both firms choose the same policy. When firms choose different price policies, we
consider two kinds of competition: simultaneous and leader-follower competition where the
discriminatory firm is the leader.
3. The choice of price policy
We solve the game by backward induction to obtain the subgame perfect equilibria. In the
second stage, there are several cases depending on the outcome of the previous stage:
3.1. Both firms price according to f.o.b.
Firms will select mill prices simultaneously. The demand for each firm is given by:
                                                
1 Other works that also consider this assumption are De Fraja and Norman (1993) and Eber (1997).
2 See Lederer and Hurter (1986) for a justification of this assumption.
3 This assumption guarantees that the whole market will be served regardless of the firms’ pricing policies.
4 See Lederer and Hurter (1986) and Thisse and Vives (1988).-2-
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1/ 2+(pj - pi)/2t        if  pj + t >  pi >  pj -t
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 i, j = 1,  2, j „ i.
The profit functions are Pi (pi, pj ) = piDi (pi, pj), i , j = 1, 2, j„ i. These profit functions are
quasi-concave, ensuring the existence of a price equilibrium. The equilibrium mill prices are given by
p1
U = p2
U = t. The equilibrium profits are P1
UU = P2
UU = t/2.
3.2.  Both firms use delivered pricing
Denote as p1(x) and p2(x) the delivered prices of firm 1 and firm 2 at a location x, 0£ x £ 1. At a
given location x, competition is à la Bertrand: with cost asymmetries if x „ 1/2 and with the same
cost if x = 1/2. Thus, in equilibrium the delivered price at x will equal the transportation cost of the
firm located further from x: p1 (x) = p2(x) = max{tx, t(1 - x)} for all x ˛[0,1].
 5 Firms’ profits are
P1
DD = { t(1- x)-tx}dx = t/4
0
1/ 2
￿  and P2




3.3. One firm is committed to f.o.b. and the other uses delivered pricing
As noticed by TV there is no equilibrium in pure strategies when firms choose different pricing
policy, under simultaneous price competition. They assume that the mill-pricing firm becomes a
price leader and the discriminatory firm is a follower. They conclude that price discrimination is a
dominant strategy and that the pricing policy game is like a Prisoner’s Dilemma. We next show that
their result crucially depends on the rules of price competition.
4. The discriminatory firm is the price-leader
Note that the fob pricing firm’s optimal response to the delivered price policy p2(x) is a mill
price p1




Z ￿  where  Z ={x˛[0,1]: p 1 +tx< p2(x)} is the firm 1’s
market area. The following Lemma characterizes the equilibrium prices.
Lemma 1. The backward induction solution is given by a pricing policy : p2
*(x) =[P 
*(R)/ x] + tx,
for the discriminatory firm and a mill price p1
* = pH(P 
*(R)) =[R + R2 -4tP 
*(R)]/ 2, for the
fob-pricing firm, where  P 
*
 is the firm 1’s profit.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium pricing policies. The discriminatory firm’s policy maintains
firm 1 indifferent between prices p1
 ˛ [ p L, p H] with a profit of  P   for firm 1.
6 
7 Given firm 2’s
pricing policy, p2(x), and firm 1’s mill price, p1, the market boundary  ˜  x  (p1) is determined by p1 + t
˜  x  (p1) = p2( ˜  x  (p1)), which yields ˜  x  (p1) = [ p2( ˜  x  (p1)) - p1]/t. To maintain firm 1 indifferent between
                                                
5 See Lederer and Hurter (1986) for a formal proof.
6 See Prescott and Visscher (1977) for a similar idea in a model of sequential choice of location.
7 The price pL is the highest price that allows firm 1 to capture all the market and to obtain a profit P  (note that pL
= P ) and pH is the highest price that allows firm 1 to obtain P  given the rival’s price policy and R.-3-
p1
 ˛ [ pL, pH) it must be satisfied that P1(p1) =  P  . Therefore the optimal pricing policy for the
discriminatory firm is p2(x) = (P / x)+tx. Note that given the price policy, p2(x) = (P / x)+tx,
the mill-pricing firm is indifferent between prices [pL, p H), and the discriminatory firm maximizes
profits when the mill-pricing firm charges the highest price pH.
8 The price pH, which depends on the
consumer reservation value, is given by  pH(P  ) =[R+ R
2 -4tP  ]/2 and firm 1’s market share
is xH(P  ) =[R- R
2 -4tP ]/2t .
Figure 1. Equilibrium pricing policies when the mill-pricing firm
is the follower.
Thus, the discriminatory firm’s profit, maintaining firm 1 with a profit P  , is:
P2(P  )=   { (P / x) +tx-t(1-x)}dx =
[R -  R
2  - 4tP ]/ 2t
1
￿ -P  lnxH(P  )+txH(P  )[1- xH(P  )]
The first order condition of the profit maximization problem is given by:
P2
¢(P  ) = -lnxH(P  )-P  [xH
¢(P  )/xH(P  )] +txH
¢(P  )[1 -2xH(P  )] = 0     (1)
If G = R - R
2 - 4tP 
* , condition (1) can be rewritten as:
-ln G/ 2t [ ]-[2tP 
* /(G R
2 - 4tP 
*)]+[t/ R
2 -4tP 
*][(t -G)/t] =0 (2)
                                                
8 The optimal price policy for the discriminatory firm holds the mill pricing firm indifferent between prices [pL,
pH]. In order for firm 1 to choose pH its profits at prices [pL, pH) must be e-below P . We have to change slightly
the discriminatory pricing policy: p2(x) = {(P / x)+ tx- d , for xH < x £  1; R for x £  xH}, with d   > 0, d ﬁ0.
t(1 - x)
p1












Therefore, the backward induction solution is given by p 2
*(x) = [P 
*(R)/ x] +  tx and  p1
* =
pH(P 
*(R)) =[R + R
2 -4tP 






* =  P2
UD   =  { [P 
*(R)/ x]+  tx-t(1- x)}dx.  
[R -  R
2  - 4tP 
*(R)]/2t
1
￿ Given that it is not
possible to obtain an explicit expression for  P 
* from condition (2), we consider a numerical
approximation. The equations of linear regression are  P 
* = -0.15064t +0.36548R (r
2= 0.9998,
where r
2 is the determination coefficient) and P2
* = 0.098288t +0.36777R (r
2@ 1). When firm 2





UD. Table 1 summarizes the possible outcomes of the second stage. The following
proposition states the main result of this subsection.
Table 1. Summary of firms’ profits.
Proposition 1. If the discriminatory firm is the leader when firms choose different pricing
policies then (i) if t < R  £  R  the pricing policy game has two Nash equilibria in pure
strategies: either both firms price uniformly or both firms price discriminate. (ii) If R  < R <
R  spatial price discrimination is a dominant strategy and the pricing policy game is a
Prisoner’s Dilemma. (iii) If R  >  R , the pricing policy game has two Nash asymmetric
equilibria in which one firm prices according to f.o.b. and the other price discriminates. This
case is the most relevant given that R  = 1.0923t  and R  = 1.0962t.
Proof.  Given Table 1, we have three possibilities:
 (i) When t < R £  R the equilibrium profits are such that P1
UU ‡ P1







DU. Therefore, there are two Nash equilibria: (U, U) and (D, D).
(ii) When  R  < R <R  the equilibrium profits are such that P1





UD  > P2
UU  > P2
DD > P2
DU. Therefore, (D, D)* is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium.
(i) When R  > R , the equilibrium profits are such that P1
DU  > P1
UU, P1
UD > P1





DD. Thus, there are two Nash equilibria: (U, D) and (D, U). If R  =  R  then (D,
D) would be also a Nash equilibrium.  Q.E.D.
5. Simultaneous price competition























strategies are allowed in the simultaneous pricing game. We have obtained that the equilibrium price
policy of the discriminatory firm is such that the mill-pricing firm is indifferent between prices in the
interval [pL(P  ), pH(P  )]. In order to find an equilibrium in the simultaneous game, we would only
need to prove that there exists a distribution function for the mill pricing firm with support in an
interval [pl( ˜  P ), ph( ˜  P )] such that the best response of the discriminatory firm to that mixed strategy
is p2(x,  ˜  P ) = ( ˜  P  / x) +tx. Lemma 2, 3 and 4 give us some properties that the equilibrium must
satisfy.
Lemma 2. In the market area of the mill-pricing firm the full price of the mill-pricing firm, is lower
than or equal to the transportation cost from the discriminatory firm.
9
Proof. If this condition is not satisfied the discriminatory firm might undercut the full price of the mill-
pricing firm in order to capture a greater market area. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. The value of  ˜  P  is t/8.
Proof.  ˜  P cannot be less than t/8 since firm 1 can always ensure this profit by charging  p1 = t/2
given that the discriminatory firm must cover transportation costs. Thus  ˜  P ‡ t/8. On the other hand,
Lemma 2 implies that p2(x, ˜  P ) = (˜  P /x) + tx cannot be always above  t(1-x)(however, the
intersection between  p1 +tx and p2(x) would be over t(1-x) which contradicts Lemma 2). The
values of  ˜  P that satisfy this condition are  ˜  P £ t/8, which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4. The support of the mixed strategy for the mill-pricing firm is the interval [t/8, t/2].
Proof. The lower extreme of the support must satisfy  pl‡ t/8 given that  p1 = t/8 is the highest
price that allows firm 1 to capture the whole market and obtain a profit of  ˜  P  = t/8. Lemma 2
implies that the intersection between  p1 +tx and  p2(x) cannot be over t(1-x). This condition is
satisfied if  ph £t/2. Finally if we do not consider the complete interval the discriminatory firm could
change its strategy to obtain more profits. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5. (i) The distribution function for the mill firmF 1
*(p1) =1-k[
-t/(t -2p1) e ]/(t -2p1) where
k = (3/4)t
(4/3) e with support [t/8,t/2] and
 (ii) the pricing policy  p2
*(x)=
t(1- x)          for x ˛[0,1/ 4)







 for the discriminatory firm.
constitute a mixed Nash equilibrium with an associated profit  ˜  P  = t/8 for the mill pricing firm.
Proof. See Appendix.
As noticed by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) “price discrimination operates, in some sense,
with respect to mill pricing as mixed strategies operate with respect to pure strategies by enlarging
the space of strategies”. Therefore, it results natural that in equilibrium the mill-pricing firm follows a
mixed strategy while the discriminatory firm uses a pure strategy.
The following proposition states the main result of this section.
                                                
9 That is, ph( ˜  P ) + tx £  t(1 - x) for x ˛ [0, xh] , where xh  denotes the marginal consumer at ph.-6-
Proposition 2. Under simultaneous price competition the price policy game has two Nash
equilibria in pure strategies: both firms price uniformly (fob) or both firms price discriminate.
Proof. Given Lemma 5, the expected profit of the discriminatory firm is given by
P2
UD = P2









￿  t /8
t/ 2
￿ dF 1
*(p1). Assume that the mill-pricing firm
follows a pure strategy  p1 = t/2 (and the discriminatory firm the pricing policy  p2
*(x) = (t/8x) +




[(3+2ln 4)/16]t. Thus, P2
UD
= P2
e(t /8)<[(3+2ln 4)/16]t < t/2 = P2
UU and from Table 1 we
conclude that the pricing policy game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: both firms price
uniformly or both firms price discriminate. Q.E.D.
6. Concluding remarks
We have shown that the general tendency for firms to price discriminate found by TV crucially
depends on the rules of price competition. In particular, spatial price discrimination is a dominant
strategy only when the mill-pricing firm is the leader and the discriminatory firm the follower. When
the leader-follower roles are reversed, equilibrium price policies depend on the consumer’s
reservation value and in the most relevant case there are two asymmetric equilibria in which one firm
price discriminates and the other firm price uniformly. Under simultaneous price competition in all
subgames, we find a mixed strategies equilibrium when firms choose different pricing policies and
we demonstrate that the pricing policy game has two perfect Nash equilibria: price discrimination
and f.o.b. pricing. Note that the fob-fob equilibrium Pareto dominates the discriminatory
equilibrium.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5
We shall obtain a distribution function for the mill-pricing firm with support [t/8,t/2] such that the
best response of the discriminatory firm to that mixed strategy is  p2
*(x). We solve the profit
maximization problem of the discriminatory firm at a generic point of the market. The discriminatory
firm sells the product to the consumer located at x if its delivered price,  p2(x), is lower than or
equal to the full price of the mill pricing firm,  p1 +tx. Thus, the probability of this event
is P(p1 +tx‡ p2(x)) = P(p1 ‡ p2(x)-tx)=1-F 1(p2(x)-tx), where  F 1(p2(x)-tx)is the
distribution function of the mill pricing firm evaluated at  p2(x)-tx. So the expected profit of the
discriminatory firm at x is P2
e(x) =[p2(x)-t(1-x)][1- F 1(p2(x)-tx)]. The first order condition
of the maximization problem is
¶P2
e(x)/¶p2(x) =[1- F 1(p2(x)-tx)] -[p2(x)-t(1- x)]f1(p2(x)-tx)= 0 (A1)
where  f1(p2(x)-tx) is the density function. (A1) can be rewritten as
[1- F 1(p2(x)-tx)]=[p2(x) -t(1- x)] f1(p2(x) -tx) (A2)
We want to obtain the density function  f1(.) such that  p2
*(x)= (t/8x)+tx is a solution for this
maximization problem. By substituting this value in (A2) we get-7-
[1- F 1(t/8x)] =[(t /8x)+2tx-t]f1(t /8x) (A3)
(A3) can be expressed as
[1- F 1(z)] ={[z
2 +(t
2/ 4)-tz]/z}f1(z)  (A4)
where (t /8x) = z. Given that  f1(z) = F 1¢(z), then (A4) is a variable coefficient first order linear
differential equation. It is straightforward to check from the solution of this differential equation that
the equilibrium distribution function for the mill firm is given by
F 1
*(p1) =1-k[
-t/(t -2p1) e ]/(t -2p1) where k = (3/4)t
(4/3) e . Q.E.D.
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